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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to look at the extent of
legislative oversight in the North Dakota State Legislature.
The State's legislators meet only once every two years for
about four months and the rest of the time they are full
time private citizens and parttime legislators.

Oversight

of North Dakota's Executive Branch must be done by legisla
tors who are being pulled in several directions by job,
family and constituents.

Oversight does not rate high on

the priority list in the legislative interim.
In order to get an idea of what types of oversight are
available to the State's legislators, this study compares
congressional oversight to State oversight techniques.
similarities are interesting.

The

While there is quite a bit

written about congressional oversight, little study has
been done on state oversight.
In order to get a handle on oversight methods avail
able to North Dakota's legislators and the methods actually
used by them a series of interviews were conducted.

Chester

Nelson, the Legislative Council's fiscal analyst and auditor
was interviewed concerning fiscal oversight available to the
State's legislators.

John Olsrud, Director of the Legisla

tive Council staff, talked about the role of the council
staff in assisting legislators in oversight.

And finally,

fourteen of the State's legislators were interviewed to
determine how they feel about oversight.
xv

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
Oversight by Congress is a tremendous undertaking and
a seemingly impossible task.

The branches of the executive

spread all over the country, making oversight hard at best.
The State Legislature, although on a smaller scale, has much
the same problem which is made more difficult because of a
parttime, citizen legislative body in North Dakota.
State programs and thus state agencies are becoming
more numerous as the federal government continues to shift
control of many programs to the states.

Many of these

programs are not new, but they are new to state government
control.
In many ways, oversight is just another way to refer to
accountability and that is what this study will try to pin
point .

More and more the public is demanding accountability

in government, and they are making those demands directly to
their elected representatives, whether they be national or
state.
The study will look at the definition and scope of
legislative oversight of the federal executive and the
methods of oversight used by the Congress.
1

Many of the same
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methods or similar techniques are available to State legis
lators in North Dakota and the discussion of federal over
sight methods will also include a comparison of the North
Dakota methods in each given category.

This will comprise

Chapter Two of the study.
The decision to look at legislative oversight by
Congress was made for two reasons.

First, Congress is the

leader in oversight techniques and an understanding of how
Congress tries to oversee the Federal Executive Branch,
makes it easier to relate those concepts to the state level,
compare them and put them in perspective.

Second, the States

so often copy the federal government's way of doing things,
that a look at congressional oversight seemed a natural
extension of the study.
There is very little written about legislative oversight
on the state level and almost nothing on legislative over
sight in North Dakota.

Time and money were limitations in

doing any type of mail or phone survey, so interviews with
state legislators were done during the 11th Biennial Summit
Conference for State Officials which was held on the UND
campus March 11-13, 1990.

A total of 14 interviews with

legislators were taped during the summit, as well as inter
views with John Olsrud, Director of the Legislative Council,
and Chester Nelson, Legislative Budget Analyst and Auditor.
The comments from North Dakota Legislators and John
Olsrud will be looked at in Chapter Three of the study.

At

3

that time an explanation of the method of questioning and
other aspects of the interview process will be detailed.
Chapter Four will consist of a conclusion on oversight
in general and more specifically its importance in the
governmental process in North Dakota.

CHAPTER TWO

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:

A BACKGROUND

In the years 1940 and 1941, two respected political
scientists found themselves at opposite ends on the argument
of responsibility over program implementation and evaluation
in the federal government.

Carl Friedrich believed in

administrative responsibility, while Herman Finer countered
that responsibility over public policy was the legislature's.
Friedrich maintained that the administrator in the
executive branch must be trusted with implementing and
redefining legislative policy.

"All institutional safe

guards designed to make public policy . . . truly responsible
1
represent approximations at that."
Friedrich was convinced
that once Congress had passed the initial legislation and
turned over implementation to the bureaucracy, that events
moved far too rapidly for any further legislative involve
ment .
The continuously changing pattern of our society,
requires that the administrator be responsive to
whatever trends may be affecting his activities.
Laws do not embody static and universal truths; they
represent expedient policies which are subject to
continuous change and must be so considered.
Instead of administering according to precedent,
the responsible administrator today works according
to anticipation.^
4
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Friedrich believed that within the parameters of the
law the administrator had a duty to do everything possible
to make programs work.

"[T]he most far-reaching of public

policies are often formed by executive agencies under the
pressure of circumstance and are merely legalized by subsequent legislation." 3
While Friedrich made some valid points in his argument
and had many supporters, Herman Finer found the idea of nonelected public servants deciding their own course of action,
with little or no congressional direction, hard to swallow.
"[T]he servants of the public are not to decide their own
course; they are to be responsible to the elected repre
sentatives of the public, and these are to determine the
course of action . . . ."

4

Finer felt the most important aspect of democratic
government is that the public and its elected representa
tives work together to force the direction which government
should take and what actions administrative officials are to
pursue.

Most important of all, is the demand for obedience

from the bureaucracy.

"The devices for securing the con

tinuing responsiveness of the official are, of course, the
law courts, the procedure of criticism, question, debate,
and fact finding . . . and the election of . . . officials
5
and their recall."
In many ways, the two arguments boiled down to moral
responsibility on the one hand and political responsibility
on the other.

Friedrich believed the administrator has the
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moral obligation to implement and form public policy.

Finer,

on the other hand, saw it completely different.
[P]olitical responsibility is the major concern of
those who work for healthy relationships between
the officials and the public, and moral responsibility,
although a valuable conception and institutional form,
is minor and subsidiary.6
It may be that Friedrich was right in assuming adminis
trators control through a moral obligation and legislators,
except for a very few, intervene only when it is politically
expedient.

However, legislative oversight takes on many

forms other than the headline grabbing or constituency
pleasing hearings as will be shown in this study.
It should come as no surprise that Finer found many
supporters in the legislative branch.

By 1946, Congress

decided it was time to define oversight and who was
responsible.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

detailed in very clear terms what congressional oversight
entailed.

The act states that each standing committee will

take the responsibility to,
exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution
by the administrative agencies concerned of any
laws, the subject of which is within the jurisdiction
of such committee.^
One change in the official definition has been made.

In the

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Congress substituted
the words "continuous watchfulness" with the words "review
g

and study."
A better definition of legislative oversight comes from
Morris Ogul.

He describes oversight as, ". . . behavior by
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legislators and their staffs, individually or collectively,
which results in an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic
behavior."

9

The behavior does not necessarily mean whole-

scale hearings, but checking of one sort or another.

It can

be checking by the whole Congress or just an individual
member of Congress or even a staff person.
be large or amount to very little.

The impact can

However, whether large

or small, the agency is aware that somebody is watching them.
In many ways, oversight in Congress is a continuous
process that members of Congress do consciously and at times
unconsciously.

However, even though Congress, through

legislation in 1946, 1970, and 1974, has recognized the
need for oversight of the executive and has given committees
expanded oversight powers, the whole idea of oversight still
ranks low on the priority lists of most members of Congress.
Members of Congress see a brighter future in legislative
involvement and constituent service than oversight.

They

tend to see the bureaucracy as a maze which they can never
penetrate and which could be hazardous to one's political
health.
Members of Congress will also establish close relation
ships with people and agencies in the bureaucracy that
aggressive oversight could destroy.

But at the same time

they are doing a certain amount of individual oversight.
Loyalty to the President can also put a damper on over
sight by members of Congress.

While these reasons for the

lack of aggressive oversight carry some legitimacy, probably
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the most obvious reason for lack of oversight is that there
are no external pressures. 10
4.

-i

Taking the premise a step further, it seems that even
when there is some pressure, members of Congress and con
gressional committees will only become involved when they
can "make rational decisions about the allocation of their
scarce personal resources . . . so as to maximize gains to
themselves in things which they value and minimize losses
in those things."'*''*'
Seymour Sher says that reasons for oversight can be to
embarrass the President, to counter outside pressure, to
revise regulations, to settle turf battles with the executive
or to expose evidence that will damage the opposition. 12
While this idea of oversight seems almost petty and vindica
tive, it is not always that way.

Some oversight is done for

the grander purpose of making sure the executive is toeing
the line and meeting objectives laid out within authorized
spending limits.

However, make no mistake, oversight is

almost always political in nature.
Legislative oversight became a reality as policy
initiation shifted from the legislative branch to the
executive branch.

While the terms congressional oversight

or legislative oversight tend to connote oversight by the
whole legislative body, the actual oversight is much more a
function of committees in most instances followed by
individual investigation.

9

After the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 both
the House and Senate created committees to oversee government
activities.

The Committees on Government Operations in each

house (HCGO and SCGO), have as their power base Public Law
601, Rule, XI(H ) which states that the committees will study,
"the operation of Government Activities at all levels with
13
a view to determining its economy and efficiency."
The Public Law is actually a statement of intent and
does not define committee action.

In fact, it places three

limitations on the committees' behavior.

"[I]nvestigations

must focus upon administrative agencies; the review is to
be of policy execution not policy itself; and the committee
14
is to investigate not legislate."
It is with this law
that the Congress finds itself dealing with the same type of
vague guidelines it regularly hands the bureaucracy.
There is obviously little in the way of an overall
policy toward oversight by the Congress.

So, both committees,

"[i]n the absence of a strong definition of larger goals
. . . [have] turned to the personal needs and interests of
individual members for a definition of committee concerns."

15

The two committees are empowered to issue subpoenas and they
are allowed to sit while Congress is not in session.

There

are also very few limitations on the substantive content of
any study they may want to conduct, so they can cut a pretty
wide path.
With all their broad investigative powers, subcommittee
structures, and other special aspects of their existence.

10

one would believe the HCGO and SCGO would have enjoyed great
success in augmenting the work of the authorizing and
appropriations committees in oversight.
not been the case.

However, that has

Lawrence Dodd and Richard Schott have

detailed several reasons for the failure.
The ability to investigate policy administration
and enforce proper policy implementation effectively
requires the authority to write legislation . . . .
The Government Operations Committees have lacked
these powers. The . . . committees are constrained
by the jealousies and animosities that other com
mittees show them. Because of this hostility the
Government Operations Committees become leary of any
action which might hurt their funding, staff assign
ments, or a total disregard of recommendations.^
Over time, the two committees have tended toward
consulting with other committees whose jurisdiction they may
be entering, looking for compromise.

They tend to be

. . . restrained in their use of publicity, [they]
constrict investigations to avoid direct conflict
with other committees, and rarely conclude investiga
tions by proposing specific legislative solutions
to problems they may uncover.-*-'
It is obvious that the attempt by both houses of
Congress to centralize oversight in the two Government
Operations Committees has not worked.

The response to this

problem has been to give substantive committees oversight
powers.

Since the Reorganization Act of 1974, oversight

has become much more the responsibility of substantive
subcommittees.
This sharing of responsibility for oversight has created
its own problems.

"[T]he decentralization trends . . . have

made the conduct of oversight even more problematic.

In

11

fact, the decentralization of congressional committees has
18
led to an oversight paradox."
The paradox seems to be
that while decentralization of oversight opens up more
access points for members within the system, it also spreads
out the power and probably weakens the ability of Congress
to oversee.
Of course there are arguments for both sides.

One side

believes that if a committee oversees many agencies there is
less chance the committee will be influenced by any one
agency.

However, others contend that with a decentralized

subcommittee system, the agency is many times the only reason
for the subcommittee's existence and therefore, control of
the situation can shift to the agency thus leading to
watered down or no oversight at all.

A third argument holds

that the oversight capabilities of subcommittees have been
strengthened with larger staffs and more access to informa
tion.

This argument holds that there has actually been more

enthusiasm for oversight under the present committee system.
Even if there were more enthusiasm for oversight, which
is highly questionable, one fact still remains:
Most studies of congressional oversight are quick
to point out that among the various functions of the
members of Congress, including legislative, repre
sentation, and policy surveillance, oversight ranks
low.
Members of Congress have a hard time finding any political
hay in oversight.

It would be unusual to see a member of

Congress rely on their oversight activities to sway voters
in a re-election bid.
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While this picture of congressional oversight looks
bleak, there is, in fact, a lot of oversight that is carried
out.

There are also many ways in which it is accomplished.

Not all of them revolve around the committee system.

The

next section deals with methods of oversight on the national
scene and in North Dakota.
Oversight Methods and Techniques:

Comparisons

Congress has at its fingertips a whole array of methods
for oversight.

In this section of Chapter Two, this study

takes a look at the more often used methods of congressional
oversight methods with those available to North Dakota
legislators.
As the research for this study unfolded, it became
clear that many of the oversight methods used by Congress
are also available to legislators in North Dakota in some
form or another.

However, in North Dakota most of these

oversight methods are not used, either through ignorance of
their existence of because of the parttime nature of the
legislator or both.
In this section, each of the more commonly used over
sight methods will be headlined followed by a discussion of
congressional use and then use of the oversight method by
North Dakota legislators.

A portion of this section will

also rely on information from Chester Nelson, Legislative
Budget Analyst and Auditor for the North Dakota Legislative
Council.

13

Constituency Service
This area of oversight is probably the most common and
yet it would probably be safe to say that members of Congress
do not look at this part of the job as oversight.

Each

member of Congress handles thousands of requests from con
stituents for help in solving one problem or another.

"The

requests range from inquiries about lost Social Security
checks or delayed pension payments to disaster relief
assistance . . . . „1
In most congressional offices, the requests or com
plaints are handled by staff members assigned to case work.
Much of this is forwarded to Washington, D.C. by the con
gressional staff in the member's home district or state.
In some instances, depending on the type of request or the
person requesting help, the representative or senator will
handle the request personally.

Even if the personal touch

is not given, all results and responses coming out of the
respective offices give the impression that the member of
Congress handled the matter personally.
The oversight comes into play because in order to take
care of most of the requests, an agency of the executive
must be contacted.

If a problem arises in solving the

situation or the agency seems hesitant to help or tries to
stall, a member of Congress could bring the matter up before
the proper committee or even discuss it on the floor of the
House or Senate.

While this rarely happens, agencies know
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it could, and are usually quick to help.

"Casework has the

positive effect of bringing quirks in the administrative
machxnery to members attention."

2

North Dakota legislators are faced with the same
requests although in much smaller numbers.

Most North

Dakota legislators understand the need to respond to con
stituent requests.

The response to constituent requests

differs in two ways on the state level as compared to
Congress.

To begin with, North Dakota legislators do not

have staff, so any dealings with executive agencies on
behalf of constituents are done personally.

Also, many

times the response to constituents' requests by the legisla
tor comes in the form of legislation introduced in the next
legislative session.
The Legislative Council staff is used extensively by
some state legislators, although many do not bother.

They

feel the Council staff is too busy to handle their requests.
The legislators themselves use phone calls, the mail, and
personal visits to departments to take care of constituent
problems.

This service by the North Dakota legislators

works to keep them informed and creates a degree of oversight
of the executive between sessions.
The Concurrent Resolution or Legislative Veto
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the legisla
tive veto was unconstitutional.

While the so-called Chadha

decision still stands and has not been overruled or modified.
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neither has congressional practice concerning the use of the
legislative veto.
In its true form, the legislative veto is nothing more
than a concurrent resolution:
The term legislative veto . . . refers to the
incorporation within a delegatory statute of a con
gressional power by concurrent resolution or simple
resolution of one house to enable executive action
under the statute, to approve or disapprove such
action, or to terminate the statutory grant of
power.3
While legislation under the terms of the Constitution
is to be sent to the president for his signature or veto,
the Congress has held the belief that concurrent resolutions
do not fall under the constitutional guidelines.

Rather,

Congress has held that the resolutions are not legislative
4
and do not have any effect outside the capitol.
Up to a
point, this is true.

A vast majority of congressional

resolutions deal with such mundane things as congratulations
to someone or some organization, or problems with capitol
grounds parking or maintenance.
At other times the concurrent resolutions have been
used to require reports from bureaus at specific times or
budget reports at times other than the yearly budget sessions.
For the most part, presidents have put up with this type of
oversight.

At other times that has not been the case.

At

those times Congress is usually being very heavy handed.
[I]n some instances it has reserved power to termi
nate a statute or program by concurrent resolution.
It has asserted power to enable or require executive
action by concurrent resolution. Finally it has
made administrative exercise of delegated power
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subject to congressional approval or disapproval
by concurrent or simple resolution.^
It was this kind of heavy-handedness by Congress that
Chadha was to have ended.

While that has been the case, it

seems that the legislative veto is more sophisticated now.
It is seen by both the executive and legislative personnel
as a necessary function of some legislation.

The following

statement made in 1956 seems to hold true today.
Experience with the concurrent resolution indicates
that Congress is more imaginative in fashioning
tools for checking and influencing the administra
tion of delegated powers than it is skillful and
determined in employing them to hold administrators
to clearly defined standards of performance.^
The effectiveness of the concurrent resolution or legisla
tive veto as an oversight tool is still in question.
The North Dakota Legislature does not use the legisla
tive veto.

That is to say, not in the way of Congress.

Much

the same effect, however, is created with Budget Section
authorizat ions.
The Budget Section is a legislative interim committee
consisting of the Lieutenant Governor, the leadership of
both houses, and selected members of the appropriations
committees in the House and Senate.

While there is some

question as to the constitutionality of the Budget Section,
the fact remains that it has statutory powers within the
North Dakota Century Code and extra authorization powers
granted during each biennial session of the legislature.
North Dakota Century Code (NDCC) 50-06-05.1(18),
provides that the Department of Human Services may terminate
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food stamp programs under certain conditions, but only with
Budget Section approval.

NDCC 54-16-01 allows Emergency

Commission transfers from the state contingency fund in
excess of 500-thousand dollars only with approval of the
Budget Section.

7

Examples of legislative delegation of approval also
abound.

During the 1987 legislative session. House Bill

1005 provided for appropriations of up to one-million dollars
in gifts for construction of a facility for the Agriculture
Extension Service, but only with Budget Section approval.
And Senate Bill 2471 during the same session, required
approval of the Budget Section before any spending of funds
for a child welfare research bureau at the University of
North Dakota would be allowed.
While withholding of approval by the Budget Section is
rare, the reality of the concept is that some major spending,
authorized by the legislature, could in fact be held from
the executive branch by the Budget Section.

A potentially

powerful oversight tool exists with the Budget Section.
The power to hold the executive accountable for actions in
many areas rests in the collective hands of the members of
the Budget Section.
The question of the constitutionality of the Budget
Section comes from delegation of authority.

Does the Budget

Section constitute illegal delegation of authority?

While

this study will not pass judgment one way or the other,
those who question the legality of the Budget Section cite
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the State Constitution.

Basically the constitution says

that all matters of fiscal policy in North Dakota must be
approved by both houses of the legislature in a vote of all
the members of the legislature.

The Budget Section and with

it the Emergency Commission have the power to make fiscal
changes in the interim without a vote of all the members of
both houses.
Hearings and Investigations
Hearings and investigations are the traditional over
sight techniques used by Congress.
held on a regular basis.

Hearings in Congress are

Representatives of departments or

agencies in the executive are called to testify before
subcommittees or authorization committees all year long.
They testify on matters of implementation of programs,
pending legislation which may affect the department or
agency, or most often in defense of their budget requests.
Investigations are held when Congress becomes aware of
possible wrongdoing in the executive branch or mismanagement
of programs or program funds by a department or agency.
Legally, investigations by Congress are to be held with the
idea of future legislation in mind.

However, this is not

always the case as evidenced by the McCarthy hearings in the
early 1950s.
While most hearings tend to escape a lot of public
scrutiny, many investigations become national news.

The
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most recent examples are the HUD mismanagement hearings,
Iran-Contra, and of course Watergate.
It is in the regularly scheduled congressional committee
hearings that the bulk of legislative oversight is conducted.
Since the Reorganization Act of 1974, the chances for
increased oversight have become more plentiful.

"[I]n com

mittees where subcommittees are accorded a prominent role in
policy-making, there will be a greater opportunity for over
sight activity than is the case in committees where subcommittees play a more restricted role."

9

The increase in staff accorded the subcommittees has
also had an influence on strengthening the idea of con
gressional hearings as oversight tools.

"Committee staff

members can be used as effective communications links with
administrative agencies . . . as a means of transmitting
congressional views to specific a g e n c i e s . T h e flow of
information therefore returns from the agencies to the com
mittee members through the staff.
It seems that the more active and aggressive the
committee or subcommittee is, the greater the amount of
oversight activity.

However, all too often, the important

senior members of a committee or subcommittee who are, "in
the best position to make the committee active in oversight,
find that their priorities lie elsewhere and therefore
devote little of their valuable time to the committee, or
oversight. 11
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Time is a problem for all members of Congress.

Members

are constantly being pulled in several directions, with each
individual pull demanding top consideration.

To properly

conduct oversight, a member of Congress must allocate a lot
of time, time the member just cannot seem to find.

So even

though congresssional hearings are an on-going oversight
method, for the most part the oversight is superficial unless
a major discrepancy or possible wrongdoing comes to light.
The North Dakota Legislature conducts full-blown
hearings for approximately three-and-one-half months every
two years.

Other hearings during the interim are also held.

Investigations by state legislative committees are rare.
The standing committee hearings occur during the
biennial sessions as they hear testimony on the 12-hundredplus pieces of legislation that are considered during the
sessions.

A vast majority of these bills are introduced by

legislators either in their own interests, for constituents,
or for local interest groups.

The rest of the legislation

consists of agency bills, also introduced by friendly
legislators.

It is during consideration of the agency bills

that the legislative committee members get the time to
question agency personnel and glean information about agency
operations and programs.
The appropriations committees of both the North Dakota
House and Senate probably dig deepest into the operations of
the executive, but time is their enemy.

In a three-and-one-
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half month span there just is not enough time for probing
oversight.
The legislative interim committees are charged with
investigating possible legislation for the next session and
in the course of their hearings will conduct some oversight
of executive agencies.

However, these committees only meet

four or five times during the interim and once again there
is limited time for oversight.
As mentioned earlier, the interim Budget Section com
mittee has the potential for oversight through the withholding
of approval for funds.

An arm of the Budget Section is the

Legislative Audit and Fiscal Review Committee, with members
appointed by both houses.
Lieutenant Governor.

The committee is chaired by the

The North Dakota Century Code, section

54-35-02.2, states in part:
It is the duty of the Legislative Audit and Fiscal
Review Committee to study and review audit reports
as selected by the committee from those submitted
by the State Auditor, confer with the auditor, and
deputy auditors in regard to such reports, and
when necessary to confer with representatives of
the department, agency, or institution audited in
order to obtain full and complete information in
regard to any and all fiscal transactions and govern
mental operations of any department, agency or
institution of the state.12
The statute also directs the Attorney General to conduct
further investigations and prosecute offenders if it is
deemed necessary and if the committee so requests.
However, in the normal course of business the audit and
fiscal review committee will take the reports, review them
briefly, and accept them with few questions and little or no
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comment. As with congressional hearings, the oversight con
ducted by the audit and fiscal review committee is super
ficial.

The committee does not take enough time or schedule

enough meetings during the interim to scrutinize every audit
report.

Once again, there is a very powerful oversight tool

in the audit and fiscal review committee, if the legislature
chose to use it, and took the time to do so.
Finally, the fact that investigating committees are
not common in the North Dakota Legislature, does not mean
the legislature does not investigate by committee.

Again,

turning to the North Dakota Century Code, section 54-03.2-03,
which reads in part:
An investigating committee may exercise its powers
during sessions of the legislative assembly, and
also in the interim . . . when so provided by law or
by the motion, resolution, or statute by which the
committee was established or from which it derives
its investigatory powers.-*-3
The committee's purposes, power, duties and length of
establishment must also be stated, as well as the subject
and scope of the investigation.

The investigating committee,

once formed, has the power to issue subpoenas.

Once again,

it is a little used means of oversight, but one that is
available nonetheless.
Authorization and Appropriations
In the matter of authorization, both the U.S. Congress
and the North Dakota Legislature operate the same.

The

difference probably lies in the amount of time that is taken
to look into each program by the authorizing committee.
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In Congress, authorization is done in the substantive
committees after receiving a subcommittee's mark-up of a
bill.

Congressional committees have staff assigned to them

and more time to get a good overview of the agency or
department and its fiscal requests before recommending
program authorization.

The full committee then relies on

the report from the subcommittee in recommending or not
recommending program authorization.
In the North Dakota Legislature, the subcommittee
system is basically non-existent.

The standing committees

do the authorizing after hearing all the testimony and
looking over the figures.

There is very little time and

almost no staff available for an in-depth oversight of the
agency or department seeking authorization.
Any bill reported out of committee (and all of them
are) in the North Dakota Legislature, goes back to the floor
first and then if there is a fiscal note attached which
exceeds five thousand dollars, the bill is re-referred to
the Appropriations Committee of that house for their considerat ion.
As an oversight tool, authorization is a very poor
method in the state legislature and not much better in
Congress.

Appropriations, however, are very important in

both Congress and the North Dakota Legislature.
Congressional appropriations committees can increase
or decrease funding or maintain the same levels.

Through

this, they can exercise immense power in shaping public
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policy.

The same holds true for the appropriations com

mittees in the North Dakota Legislature.
Congressional appropriations committees, like other
substantive committees, have subcommittees.

This means that

authorization bills are farmed out and get a closer look.
It seems that one of the best ways to oversee any executive
branch agency or department is to look at their spending
patterns in relation to the effectiveness of their programs
and their requests for continued funding.

Many hard and

pointed questions can be asked and often are in appropri
ations hearings.
For the North Dakota Legislature the ability of the
appropriations committees to dig deeply into agency
activities is limited, again because of time.

However,

unlike other standing committees which meet either three
times or two times a week during the session, the appropri
ations committees meet five days a week.

This, of course,

allows the appropriations committees more time to dig and
question, but on the down side, it also allows more time for
test imony.
In recent sessions of the North Dakota Legislature, the
House Appropriations Committee has experimented with dividing
itself into three subcommittees to better oversee the
appropriations process.

These subcommittees hear testimony

separately and then report back to the full committee with
their recommendations.

The jury is still out as to how

effective this method has been.

The State Senate
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Appropriations Committee has not been able to follow suit
because they are a much smaller body.
The appropriations committees in Congress and the North
Dakota Legislature are some of the best oversight tools
available to the full legislative body.

This is very true

with the State Legislature, as it conducts its business
in such a short period of time.
The General Accounting Office (GAO)
The GAO is Congress's premier field investigator.
The agency sends congress some 1,000 reports
annually, addressing ways to root out waste and
fraud in government programs and promote program
performance.
The General Accounting Office is headed by the Comptroller
General who is appointed for a single 15-year term with the
advice and consent of the Senate.

The most important

characteristic of the GAO is that it works only for
Congress.
The work of the GAO in many cases supplements reporting
requirements of agencies, which are written into their
authorizing legislation.

These reports from the agencies

also number in the thousands and tend to be very vague and
general for the most part.

The reports are also far too

numerous for members of Congress to digest in total.
best, " . . .

At its

the report requirement encourages self-evaluation

by the executive branch and promotes agency accountability
to C o n g r e s s . T h e r e f o r e , the work of the GAO is a very
important backup method of oversight for the Congress.
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The GAO has seen a couple of major changes in its duties
in the past 15 years.

In 1975, the Program Analysis Division

was created followed five years later by the Institute for
Program Evaluation.

These new additions came about as a

result of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment
17
Act.
Wxth these new additions, " . . . GAO has created the
potential for serving as an evaluation broker, planner, and
conduct agent for congressional committees." 18
The program evaluation duties of the GAO provide a
"special type of oversight that has been specifically pro
vided for in many agency appropriations bills since the late
1960s and in the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment
19
Control Act."
This oversight approach is done through
the use of surveys, cost-benefit figures and other modeling
and efficiency studies.

Obviously, the congressional staff

has little time or resources for these studies.

Thus the

GAO takes on added importance in legislative oversight by
Congress.
The North Dakota Legislature does not have a GAO to
rely on, but a combination of existing agencies has created
a similar oversight tool.

The two agencies are the Legisla

tive council and its staff of budget analysts and auditors
and the State Auditor, which is an elected executive
posit ion.
To get an expert's outlook on this form of legislative
oversight in North Dakota, Chester Nelson, the Legislative
Budget Analyst and Auditor for the Legislative Council was
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interviewed.

Along with the State Auditor and Nelson's

staff of four budget analysts, Nelson adds the Legislative
Audit and Fiscal Review Committee as a player in this form
of oversight.

"We have the Legislative Audit and Fiscal

Review Committee which looks at the audit process and as a
part of that, there should be a strong look at compliance
with legislative appropriations and legislative intent." 20
Across the country, many states have moved the auditing
function to the legislative branch.

In June, 1990, the

voters of North Dakota will have a chance to change the State
constitution and move the State auditor's office from the
executive branch to the legislative branch.
believe this will create any real change.

Nelson does not
"If it were not

for the legislature in the audit process, I don't think the
personnel in the auditor's office would feel they have a
constituency."^
Nelson says that over the last 20 years, almost all
changes in the audit process have been initiated by the
legislative audit and fiscal review committee.

These changes

have been made, even with the fact that the actual audits
are done by the executive branch.
In terms of major direction, in terms of what the
audits (from the State auditor) produce and the use
of information from the audits, that is really under
the control of the legislative branch right now.
The thrust of the audit program is really subject
to review by legislative staff.22
While the GAO conducts performance audits of agency
programs, North Dakota is still struggling with that.

Nelson
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says it is not because of lack of interest.

A resolution

in the 1971 legislative session directed the legislative
council to look at performance audits.

According to Nelson,

money, staff, and time have prevented implementation of any
on-going performance audits.
However, in another area the North Dakota Legislature
will soon be receiving better insight into the operations of
state government, and thus better oversight of those opera
tions.

The new insight will come in the form of comprehensive

annual financial statements of the state.

They will be

issued for the first time beginning with fiscal 1991.

The

issuance of this statement will conclude a twenty-year
development process in this area.
All of the information gathered by the State auditor's
office, the legislative budget analyst's office and the
legislative audit and fiscal review committee is made
available to state legislators.

In the interim this is a

powerful oversight group for the legislature.

"We live in

a state where the job gets done structurally, it may be one
place or another, but both in the budget area and the
accounting area, the legislature has a strong influence."

23

However, as in Congress, state legislators will only
see the oversight value of all the information if they
take time to digest it.

It would seem logical to expect

that some will but most will not.
These are some of the more important and effective ways
the Congress and the Legislature have to oversee the executive
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branch.

Other methods include informal contacts between

legislators and the bureaucracy which was mentioned earlier
and goes on quite frequently both on the national and state
levels.

There is Senate confirmation which is used with

some effect in Congress, but with little effect in the
North Dakota Legislature.

Because the legislature meets

only four months every two years, most of the governor's
appointments which require Senate confirmation are made
during the interim.

Therefore, once the Senate is back in

session, confirmation is a pro forma matter.

There is also

individual oversight which goes beyond informal contacts.
This form of oversight was practiced most prominently on
the national scene by Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire
when he issued his "Golden Fleece" awards.
In North Dakota, the practice of individual oversight
is used much more often.

As stated earlier, North Dakota

legislators are not blessed with individual staff.

Many are

reluctant to burden the Legislative Council staff and
therefore are much more apt to visit or write department
heads directly and do their own digging for answers.

Many

consider this just part of the job and really do not look
at their actions as oversight.

Rather, they will likely

call it constituency service, which this study has labeled
as an oversight tool.
In Congress, except for the occasional Proxmire,
individual oversight is hit and miss at best, and usually
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done only if the member of Congress can make some political
hay back home or advance his or her reputation in Congress.
This study will now turn its attention to legislative
oversight as seen through the eyes and experience of fourteen
current North Dakota legislators.

Before the study looks

at the responses of the legislators, it will take a look at
the legislative council.

It has been mentioned throughout

the early part of this study and it seems only fair to
explain its functions.

This information was gathered from

an interview with the legislative council director John
Olsrud.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND STAFF
The Legislative Council is described by many legislators
as the interim "board of directors" for the North Dakota
Legislature.

It is the eyes and ears of the legislature

during the time the body is not in session.

The legislative

audit and fiscal review committee, the Budget Section, and
the administrative rules committee all report to the
legislative council.

The administrative rules committee

will be discussed later in this chapter.

For forty-five

years, the Legislative Council committee and its staff have
attempted to oversee the executive branch of North Dakota
government.
The Legislative Council committee was created during
the 1945 legislative session.

The council membership is

detailed in NDCC section 54-35-01, which reads in part:
The Legislative Council shall consist of the majority
and minority leaders of the House and of the Senate
plus five senators and six representatives to be
chosen biennially before the close of each regular
session . . . . [T]he speaker must by virtue of his
office be one of the three members appointed from
his faction. In the Senate the council members must
be . . . three from the majority faction and two
from the minority faction.-*-
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The Legislative Council committee's powers and duties are
listed in NDCC section 54-35-02.

There are several important

oversight provisions in this section of the code which read
in part:
To study, consider, accumulate, compile, and assemble
information on any subject upon which the legisla
tive assembly may legislate, and upon such subjects
as the legislative assembly may . . . authorize or
direct, or any subject requested by a member of the
legislative assembly; to collect information concern
ing the government and general welfare of the
state . . .; to study and consider important issues
of public policy . . .; [and] to prepare bills and
resolutions for consideration of the succeeding
legislative assembly.^
The section also allows the council to solicit help from
other members of the legislative assembly and form committees
to help them.

The council also has subpoena power.

Membership on the legislative council is highly prized
and at times legislators will actively campaign within the
party caucus for an available council appointment.

A

legislator appointed to the council serves from the end of
one legislative session until the end of the next legislative
session.

The legislator may be reappointed to the council

indefinitely.

If a legislator resigns or is not reelected,

the member appointed to fill the vacancy must come from
the same party and sits only until the end of the next
legislative session.

The members of the council also serve

as the chairmen of the several interim committees between
sessions.3
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The Council Staff
While the legislative council committee of fifteen is
prestigious, it is only as good as the legislative council
staff.

The staff consists of a group of attorneys and

accountants who research, gather, and distribute information
to the committee and the rest of the legislators.
The 1945 legislative council committee was the only
interim committee of the legislature.

Its basic purpose

was to get a headstart on the next legislative session.

In

the 1949 session it was decided the committee should have
some staff and a director and a secretary were hired.

After

quickly going through three directors, the committee hired
Emerson Murray.

Murray would remain as director for twenty-

five years and would oversee the growth of the council to
its current size of fifteen.
The major addition to the legislative council staff
during Murray's tenure came in 1965 with the creation of the
legislative budget analyst and auditor.

Since 1965 the

council staff has consisted of all attorneys and certified
public accountants.

Emerson Murray was succeeded by John

Graham in 1975 and Graham was succeeded in 1982 by the
4
council's current director, John Olsrud.
In a recent interview with John Olsrud for the purposes
of this study, he was asked how much of the staff-work is
concerned with legislation planned for the next session and
how much is oversight of existing statute.

"Most of what

we do is directed to the upcoming legislative session.

Most
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of the studies we are involved with, involve looking at
prospective legislation."

5

However, Olsrud says there are

two committees which are directly involved with looking at
the executive and which are staffed by the Legislative
Council staff.
One is the legislative audit and fiscal review com
mittee that was created in 1965. That committee has
audit review. The state auditor or private auditors
who do auditing of state agencies come before that
committee and report on what they have found. The
other committee that is involved with reviewing the
executive branch is the administrative rules com
mittee. This committee is about 12-years old. They
look at all the administrative rules where the
executive branch has taken statute and interpreted
them and promulgated rules.®
The administrative rules committee is the legislature's
way of checking if the executive is following legislative
intent in interpreting and implementing legislation.

The

staff attorneys of the council become very important to the
legislature in this process.

Olsrud says every once in a

while something the executive has done administratively does
not set well with the legislators.
comes from misconstruing.

"I don't think very much

Although we have had some

experiences where the executive branch is doing something
legislators don't think was intended so they will recommend
7
the laws be amended."
When asked whether the council staff should be more
directly involved in oversight, rather than just supplying
information and advice to committees, Olsrud was somewhat
reticent in his answer.
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That is hard to say. I'm not aware of any glaring
areas where additional oversight is needed. But I
have 159 bosses and I'm sure a number of those
legislators would have their own ideas about different
aspects. But, I'm not aware of any overwhelming
single area where there is a need for more over
sight .8
Much of Olsrud's hesitance in answering that question comes
from the mission of the council as a non-partisan arm of
the legislature.

Olsrud is conscious of this at all times,

and the council staff goes out of its way to maintain that
neutrality.

Olsrud says the non-partisan nature of the

council staff is emphasized when the media is seeking
information.
We are available and will always help in providing
background information. I [Olsrud] understand, and
the staff has to understand, there are times when
we are the story, so then we are quotable sources.
But if we are providing background information, we
usually ask that they [media] not quote us, simply
because that makes us a part of the story. If most
members of the press understand that, then we will
be far better sources of information if they cooper
ate. I don't think it's asking too much of them.^
Olsrud says that in most cases they try to lead the press
to a source by giving them a name of a legislator to contact
or dropping a series of not-so-subtle hints to move them in
the right direction.
As State Government has become more complex, the topic
of the annual sessions comes up often.

Up to this point,

opposition from those who firmly believe in a parttime
citizen legislature, has blocked any move to have the
legislature meet every year.

The idea of annual sessions

does not sit well with John Olsrud.

He feels they would

create great problems with the legislative council staff.
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It would be very hard to operate the way we do now
because there is so much pressure on the staff during
that period of time and people virtually give up their
private lives for about six months. If we were to do
that every year, it would be a tremendous human toll.
The way it is now, we tell people we expect that of
them. We couldn't do that if that were to happen
every year.lu
Olsrud is referring to the fact that the legislative
council staff researches and drafts a majority of the bills
considered during the session.

They also must check all

bills which are drafted elsewhere for style and form.

Beyond

that, the legislative council staff has the duty of "staff
ing" all committees of the legislature.

This means that a

member of the council staff is in attendance at all times
to tape the proceedings, take notes, and answer procedural
questions.
Olsrud says that each session of the legislature creates
more work for the legislative council staff.

He says in

recent sessions joint legislative-executive committees have
been established which are staffed by the council.

The

workload continues to grow, but Olsrud is hesitant to request
an increase in his staff.
I try very hard not to be an empire builder. One
thing that I am not doing is pushing for more power
or more authority or more staff or what have you.
What I see happening though, is there is a natural
tendency as government gets more complex there are
more and more demands on the legislature and there
are more and more demands on the legislative council
staff because of that. So the empire is being built
by the legislature, so to speak.li
The legislative council staff is an extremely important
tool for oversight by the legislature as a whole and for
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each individual legislator.

However, the council staff's

workload and small size has also become a hindrance to its
use as an oversight tool.
While the legislators are aware of the benefit for
oversight the council staff gives them, they are hesitant
to use the staff because they feel the staff does not have
time.

Therefore, the obvious result is that the legislator

uses other less effective means of oversight and lets a
major oversight tool go untapped.
The preceding observation comes from the interviews
with fourteen current members of the North Dakota Legislatue
about their views on legislative oversight.

It is to those

interviews that this study now turns.
The Legislator's Viewpoint
So far in this study, oversight by Congress has been
discussed, the oversight methods available to members of
Congress have been compared with similar methods of over
sight available to North Dakota legislators, and the North
Dakot Legislative Council's oversight importance has been
discussed.

Now it is time to hear from members of the

North Dakota Legislature about their feelings toward legis
lative oversight.
To accomplish this, fourteen current legislators repre
senting the Senate and the House were interviewed during
the 11th Biennial Summit Conference, March 11-13, 1990,
which was held on the campus of the University of North
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Dakota.

The interviewees were not randomly selected in

advance.

Those interviewed were legislators who were

available during coffee and lunch breaks or at the end of
each day's seminars.

Some were also attending interim

committee meetings scheduled at the same time and they were
available during breaks.

The time for interviewing was

limited, but effort was made to find a good cross-section
of legislative experience among those legislators inter
viewed .
Of the fourteen legislators interviewed, six are
republicans, eight are democrats.
tors.

Four are women legisla

The average years of service in the House or Senate

or both through the November 1990 elections is 9.7 years.
The range was from two years to twenty years.

Six of the

legislators serve in the North Dakota State Senate and eight
serve in the State House.
State Senators
Corliss Mushik (D-Mandan), Dan Wogsland (D-Hannaford), Wayne
Stenehjem (R-Grand Forks), Jack Ingstad (R-Grand Forks), Art
Todd (R-Jamestown), and John Olson (R-Bismarck).
State Representatives
Dan Gerhardt (D-Williston), Judy DeMers (D-Grand Forks), Bill
Skjerven (D-Park River), Janet Wentz (R-Minot), Charles
Mertens (D-Devils Lake), Roy Hausauer (R-Wahpeton), Diane
Ness (D-Underwood), and Jay Graba (D-Grand Forks).
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Five questions were originally planned for each inter
view.

However, it was apparent from the first interview

that the answers to some questions were overlapping into
other questions.

As an example, the question asked about

the legislator's individual oversight methods many times
also answered the question concerning their use of the
legislative council and their feelings about the council's
oversight powers.

So, while all five questions were not

always specifically asked in each interview eventually all
five questions were answered in every interview.
To summarize the interviews, each question will be used
as a heading and a summary will follow and quotes from
some of the legislators will be used to emphasize the view
points expressed in relation to each question.
1.

What is the major oversight method available to the
legislature as a whole while in or out of session?
There was very little hesitation on the part of any of

the legislators in answering this question.

All fourteen

felt the appropriations and budget committees were the major
oversight tools available to the legislature as a whole.
The legislators felt that having the ability to question the
executive agencies about program spending and planning during
the session, gave them some idea of what they should be
looking for during the interim in terms of oversight.

How

ever , the legislators also took advantage of the question
to expand on their answers.

Some mentioned the Legislative
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Council staff and many used the question to voice support
for annual sessions as an oversight tool.

The annual

session question will be dealt with separately later in
this part of the study.
It is appropriations and budgeting that take center
stage with the legislators as an oversight tool during the
session.

Representative Jay Graba of Grand Forks is a

member of the House Appropriations Committee:
We [the appropriations committee] are the budgeters
for the State even more so than the governor. He
gives us a plan, but the end result is what we send
out, not necessarily what the governor requests.
So I guess we are certainly the biggest oversight
committee.
Graba feels that because it is the appropriations committee
which is determining the final budget numbers for each
agency, a certain amount of control over agency actions is
gained.
Senator Art Todd of Jamestown said, "The budget process
is the primary vehicle the legislature has to oversee the
executive."

2

Senator Wayne Stenehjem of Grand Forks echoed

those sentiments.

"The tool that we have for oversight

largely would be the appropriations process and within that,
the legislative statutory power to get things done."

3

Representative Judy DeMers of Grand Forks saw two areas of
oversight for the whole legislature.
I think two primary areas are the budget power; if
you don't fund them they can't do it. And secondly,
the lawmaking power. Obviously if there is something
you really don't like you can go in and try to change
it through the legislative process.^
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However, DeMers also sees a flip side to the issue.

"On

the other hand, I think that the executive tends to basically
do what they want to do between sessions.
Finally, Representative Janet Wentz of Minot had the
most interesting answer to the question.

After immediately

answering that the appropriations committees and Legislative
Council committee and staff were important in legislative
oversight, she paused and then added:
I think incumbency is very important to the legisla
ture. We are a parttime citizen legislature and it
takes us a number of sessions to learn the process
and become familiar with the agencies and all of
those funding sources.^
Not the kind of answer one would expect, but one which
probably carries a lot of truth.
2.

What oversight tools do you use as an individual
legislator?
The answers to this question were not as cut-and-dried

as the first question.

The legislators cited constituency

service, use of the Legislative Council staff and its
reports, and the tracking of legislation in which they have
taken a personal interest as means of personal oversight.
Constituency service for North Dakota Legislators amounts
to following up on concerns about state programs that are
affecting individuals back home.

This takes up a lot of

the legislator's time due to the lack of any personal staff.
The Legislative Council staff issues reports throughout the
interim which most legislators try to read.

Personal
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interest in certain areas of government is usually acquired
from sevice on a committee that handles that issue during
the regular session.

The most interesting revelation by

the legislators in answer to this question was the reliance
on the media as an oversight tool.
For parttime legislators, their constituency becomes
very important to them in keeping track of legislation and
its implementation.

What really concerns the people in the

district is the message brought to the legislator by his or
her constituency.

It is a constituent's concerns which can

move a legislator to take a closer look at executive agency
policies.
A lot of times, the ones [programs] I tend to focus
on the most are the ones I get complaints from
constituents on. All of a sudden you find yourself
in one area or another trying to figure out why a
law is being implemented when you know the intent
was quite a bit different.^
Representative Bill Skjerven of Park River feels
constituent service is probably the best oversight tool a
legislator has.
When I really get involved is when some constituent
comes with some complaint. Then my solution has
always been that I go to that agency or department
head and start asking questions. I believe that is
the most effective thing a legislator can do.^
The legislators also believe the legislative council
is a good tool to use in individual oversight.

"You can

always go to the Legislative Council [committee] and have a
special committee created to examine problem areas."

9

While

this kind of use of the legislative council seemed extreme
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for the other legislators, others did say the council helps
keep them informed.

"The legislative council really helps

the legislature be as year round as possible.
major reporting agency.""^

It is our

Senator Art Todd feels the

Legislative Council committee and staff are invaluable.
The Legislative Council [committee and staff] does
have a lot of oversight power over the executive
branch. The Legislative Council staff is extremely
helpful, not only to the interim committee process
and the flow of information, but it is also extremely
beneficial to individual legislators in dealing with
constituents .In
state Senator Dan Wogsland of Hannaford had nothing
but praise for the flow of information from the Legislative
Council staff for use in oversight.

He is also amazed that

so much information can be generated by so few people. "The
council is just excellent.

They are understaffed and they

are underpaid and they need more people and there is no
question about it." 12
State Senator Corliss Mushik of Mandan feels that the
lack of personnel in the council is a real problem.
council is a very busy body.

"The

They really don't have the

time to deal with individual legislators in this kind of
13
business [oversight]."
Most legislators, if they are in office long enough,
will find themselves taking an interest in one or two issues
and therefore dealing most closely with the executive
agencies in charge of the programs surrounding those issues.
These agencies then take on more importance to the legisla
tors.

As a result, the bulk of the legislator's oversight
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activities will revolve around the agencies administering
those programs in the legislator's special sphere of interest.
Freshman Representative Diane Ness of Underwood is a
member of the House Education Committee.

Since the end of

the session she has found that she focuses her attention
more toward education issues.

"I'll pick a couple of areas

where I like to keep track and the rest of it I have no
idea.

It's just too hard to keep in contact with everything
when you only meet once every two years." 14 Senator Dan
Wogsland also believes each legislator strives for expertise
in certain areas.

"I think each legislator has got his
niche and watches that niche pretty closely." 15
As was mentioned earlier, it was surprising how many
of the legislators mentioned the media as a valuable over
sight tool.

Six of the fourteen legislators mentioned the

press as a source of oversight material or as a catalyst
which can move them to check-up on an agency or department.
State Senator Jack Ingstad of Grand Forks stated the
case for the media most strongly.

"The media is probably

the biggest overseer of the executive branch of government.
They are the ones that keep the public and the legislators
informed as to what is going on." 16
Other comments came from Senator Todd:

"The press

keeps the agencies pretty much in-line"; Representative
Wentz:

"I certainly read everything that the news media

prints and one picks up problems in there"; and Senator
17
Olson:
"Quite often media stories may cause action."
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While the media was never mentioned as an oversight
tool for Congress, it would seem that in a small state like
North Dakota, the state legislators rely on the media quite
often.

This is not all that surprising if one considers

North Dakota's liberal open records and open meetings laws,
which allow the press the access to and the ability to write
about almost anything that goes on in State government.
With no staff, and very little time spent in Bismarck it
seems logical that the State's legislators would turn to the
press to help them in oversight of the executive branch
during the interim.
Before leaving this question of individual oversight,
the study would be remiss if it did not mention the comments
of the one legislator out of the fourteen that is not all
that concerned with individual oversight on his part.
Senator Jack Ingstad says his input is very little and he
is satisfied with the information he receives from Legisla
tive Council committee and staff.
I may be different than most. I feel comfortable
with the executive branch of government. They
are elected by the people just like the legislature.
I am one that feels they should be given some leeway
in the decision making process. We are not in
Bismarck most of the time and I feel comfortable for
the executive branch to be making decisions for us
within the framework of our legislation that we
pass each session.^
3.

Should the legislative council staff have more power?
All fourteen of the legislators interviewed felt the

Legislative Council staff was a valuable oversight tool
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and that their information and research was tremendous.
One would think then that the legislators would want a
council staff with even more power.
the case in these interviews.

However, that was not

Only two of the legislators

felt the council staff should be more powerful.
One who feels that the legislative council staff is
fine with the power that it has is former House Speaker and
twenty year veteran of the House, Roy Hausauer, of Wahpeton.
Hausauer believes, "The staff has enough power to enter the
agencies and is very knowledgeable.

They are the backbone
19
of the legislative council committee."
Senator Wayne Stenehjem left no doubt about his feelings
on the matter of the power of the legislative council staff.
They are resource people and drafting people. They
do not have nor do they ever attempt, that I am
aware of, to exercise any influence over the executive
branch. Nor could they. They just don't have the
statutory authority and that's not what they are set
up for . 2 0
Representative Charles Mertens of Devils Lake,
current chairman of the legislative council committee, begs
to differ with Stenehjem.

"We've got some tools in place

through the legislative council [committee].

We've got the

audit and fiscal review committee and the other strong one
is the Budget Section.
authority." 21

It has a lot of statutory

While Mertens is referring to the legisla

tive council committee, by inference he is also including
the staff.

The powers of the council committee are visited

upon the staff.

It is the staff that carries out the

council's wishes and supplies it with information.
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Senator John Olson believes the legislative council
staff has plenty of power.

However, according to Olson,

"There is a general reluctance by the legislative council
to get involved."

22

The reluctance on the part of the legislative council
staff probably stems from its non-partisan mission which
was mentioned earlier.

Representative Judy DeMers also sees

this reluctance as a drawback while still feeling that the
council staff could use more power.
I would like to see it [council staff] strengthened.
I think part of the great value is that they are
non-partisan. That is also part of the great problem.
They bend over backwards, in terms of the message
about what is going on, not to bias that message
with any kind of particular focus. Sometimes it takes
awhile to understand what they are sending out. So,
I would like to see it be more investigative.23
While some feel some changes could be made and others
have differing viewpoints as to the council's duties, most
seem to feel that the current power base of the council is
enough.
4.

As a legislator, do you find certain agencies harder
to oversee than others?
The resounding answer to this was "yes" and the

Department of Human Services led the way as the hardest
agency to oversee.

Also mentioned were the Departments of

Higher Education and Public Instruction, and the Highway
Department.
This question created one or two sentence answers for
the most part.

State Senator Corliss Mushik summed up the
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problem with human services.

"They have such a myriad of

programs that there is absolutely no way that I as an
individual who does not work in the department or work
putting that budget together can really understand." 24
State Senator John Olson also believes that the size of
the department dictates how hard the department is to
oversee.
It's always easier to pick on the little guy because
it is not too difficult to find out what he is doing
and how he is doing it. It's more difficult to pick
on the big ones like human services, or higher
education or the highway department, because there
are so many programs and so many areas of regulation.
It's almost impossible for any individual to have a
handle on all of that.^5
Representative Jay Graba does not seem to see a problem
with any agency, large or small.

"I have always felt that

departments have all been accessible and answered my
questions." 2 6

Senator Dan Wogsland was a little more

philosophical in his answer.

"There are a lot of different

agencies that are more accessible just simply because the
27
people in charge are more accessible."
The greater the number of funding sources and the
greater the number of money transfers seems to dictate
which agencies legislators consider hardest to oversee.
5.

When you leave the Capitol after three-and-one-half
months in session, do you feel like you are turning
the fox loose in the hen house?
This question was designed to be a "fun" question, but

also one that would pull together all the legislator's
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thoughts about oversight.

It was hoped the question would

cause the legislators to take a second look and decide
whether the fox [the executive branch] is in fact loose in
the hen house.
Rather than trying to summarize the legislator's
answers and then give a few examples, for this question
each legislator's name will be listed with his or her
answer immediately following.
Senator Corliss Mushik:
"Just about the minute after I
leave. As soon as we've left the premises, it's almost as
if they [executive personnel] give this enormous sigh of
relief, go about their business and you [legislators] really
don't have any idea what is happening."2 °
29
Senator John Olson:
"I have never felt that way."
Representative Diane Ness: "I don't know that I would go
that far. I just know that it is awfully hard for legisla
tors to keep track of everything that is going on when you
only meet every other year.
Representative Jay Graba:
"As of right now, I think the
oversight is there. I really do. I don't think that we
lack it . " 3 1
Senator Jack Ingstad:
"The legislature shouldn't be too
concerned with overseeing those executive branches. We
direct, at the very beginning, the budget and the duties
and if they don't fulfill those responsibilities, then the
people, every four years, have the responsibility to remove
them . " 3 3
Representative Roy Hausauer:
"It is hard to say. After
we do leave the session, I do find things change. We are
not there 24-hours a day anymore and things do change after
you leave, absolutely. " 3 3
Senator Art Todd:
"You find, I think, that the agencies
are watching their 'Ps' and 'Qs' very carefully when the
legislature is in session. They perhaps slacken a little
bit as time goes on once the legislature leaves town. How
ever, I don't think I've seen any blatant abuses. So, I
don't see any real foxes running rampant through the hen
house."34
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Senator Dan Wogsland:
"I think a lot more can be done to
oversee the executive. Certainly the legislature has given
up a lot of power to the executive. We have delegated
too much."35
Representative Dan Gerhardt: "You have to count on the
bureaucrat to implement and run the programs. You have to
have that faith in them. But you should also be able,
every off-year, to come in and check on the implementation
of the programs."36
Senator Wayne Stenehjem:
"Sometimes you work and say, 'I
hope what we just got done passing is what they [the
executive branch] will do.' But as I have said many times
during the legislature, 'we will always be back.' I think
that the people in the executive branch remember that. We
will be back."37
Representative Judy DeMers: "I don't. I guess I basically
trust the executive unless they do otherwise and then you
follow up on it."38
Representative Bill Skjerven:

"I don't have that feeling. "3

Representative Charles Mertens:
"It could be. I have
never gotten that feeling. I know a lot of legislators have
complained about that. My personal opinion, after twenty
years of service in the legislature, is that the executive
branch has just not abused their power that much."40
Representative Janet Wentz: "I've never felt that way. I
have always had a lot of faith and confidence in our public
employees. I think we have to operate that way. Until that
confidence is proven to be misplaced, then I'll be satisfied
that we have done our job and they can be relied upon to do
theirs."41
It seems the feeling of these fourteen legislators is
one of a little bit of worry, once in a while, about leaving
the executive by itself with money and programs, but not a
lot of great concern.

Except for Senator Mushik, who

definitely sees the fox running loose and Senator Wogsland
who fears too much delegation of power, the others seem
comfortable with a system which has worked so far and been
almost abuse free.
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Annual Sessions
As stated earlier, a question about annual sessions was
not asked as part of the survey.

However, annual sessions

as an oversight tool was mentioned by nine of the fourteen
legislators during the course of the interviews.

All of

those who mentioned annual sessions cited the need for
closer oversight of the executive budget as the primary
reason.

The following consists of four examples:

Senator Corliss Mushik:
"I believe we should have annual
sessions. I think the fact that we have to project appropri
ations budgeting two and sometimes three years in advance
in today's world is ridiculous."42
Senator John Olson:
"I've advocated in the last couple of
years that we go to annual sessions. Many of these budgets,
like human services, are very complex and difficult to
understand. So taking a look at it every two years just
doesn't make this thing work very well anymore.
Senator Dan Wogsland:
"We try to do too much with too
little. You are not going to run a billion dollar business
meeting four months every two years. Government isn't a
business, but we [legislators] are the board of directors,
we are the managers of the State, and you can't properly
manage in that way. I think North Dakota's got to quickly
come to the day when we go to the annual sessions and
expand our role.
Representative Dan Gerhardt: "We need a nineteen-day
session in the off-years to check what's going on. We need
to check and see what legislation has been implemented, how
it's been implemented, and what can be done to correct it.
It's kind of like being a Monday morning quarterback."45
A change to annual sessions does not need a constitu
tional amendment unless the eighty-day limit is to be
changed.

A change would not need a vote of the people.

The

legislature can divide up the session any way it sees fit,
as long as the total of legislative days does not exceed
eighty in a biennium.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
Oversight, whether it be in Congress or the North
Dakota Legislature is tough to measure.

This study has

shown that both legislative bodies have an abundance of
oversight tools.

It has also shown, that while members of

Congress and the State Legislature are aware of their over
sight responsibilities, few choose to use the tools given
them on a regular basis or to their fullest extent.
The North Dakota Legislature
Members of the North Dakota Legislature are very aware
of the independence of the executive branch in the time
between legislative sessions.

However, it seems the State's

lawmakers are content with occasional questioning of execu
tive agencies or their own faith in the executive's integrity,
rather than aggressive oversight, to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness in spending and program implementation.
For the most part, members of the North Dakota Legisla
ture cannot be faulted for their lack of aggressive oversight.
They are parttime lawmakers.

While some are retired farmers.
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laborers, or businessmen, the majority hold down full-time
jobs in the private sector.

It is those jobs and not their

legislative salaries that put food on the table.
The work they do for constitutents, the time spent
attending interim committee meetings and reading pages of
information sent out by the legislative council staff, must
all be balanced against the time needed to earn their real
living.
Only a handful of the State's legislators live in or
near the capitol city.

For most, any personal oversight

meetings with agencies will involve many miles and many hours
of driving.

There is also the problem of staff.

legislators do not have personal staff.

The State

Therefore, every

visit, every letter, and every phone call, must be handled
by the individual legislator.
Time is the real enemy of those serving in the North
Dakota Legislature.

There is not enough time during the

interim to balance job and legislative oversight duties.
While in session, the eighty day time limit leaves very
little time for proper oversight hearings by the committees.
Every bill introduced must have at least one hearing and
be voted on at least once on the floor of either the House
or Senate.

In past sessions the bill load has climbed close

to fifteen-hundred.
Many feel that annual sessions would help the legisla
ture lighten its load and do a better job of oversight.
However, unless the time limit of eighty days is expanded.
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those feelings may not be well grounded.

The time in each

session would be split in some way, but it could not exceed
eighty days.

There is also no indication that the bill

load would lighten.
During the interviews, the legislators did not mention
bureaucratic expertise.

However, there does not seem to

be much doubt, that as State Government in North Dakota
becomes more complex, the bureaucracy will become more
expert, which could be a negative or positive factor for
legislators in oversight of the executive branch.

While the

legislators could tap into the expertise of the bureaucracy
to better educate themselves, they could also find them
selves plowed under by jargon and technology and therefore
shy away from any effective oversight.

For many legislators,

as the expertise of the bureaucracy grows, so should their
faith in the executive.
While North Dakota's legislators can find aggressive
oversight difficult for all the reasons cited above, there
is one area of fault that falls on the legislators because
of and not in spite of the reasons cited above.

In the

course of this study it has become clear that legislative
oversight is difficult for the parttime legislature.

At

the same time it has become clear that the legislators have
not educated themselves as to the oversight tools available
to them and the amount of oversight power they actually
possess.

It would seem, that with all the difficulties the
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legislator has in conducting oversight, education about the
tools available would be primary.
The legislators seem hesitant to use the legislative
council staff even though they have high praise for the
council's work.

The legislators seem unaware of the

tremendous oversight possibilities of the audit and fiscal
review committee, the Budget Section, and the administrative
rules committee.

They also seem unaware of the oversight

possibilities held by the interim committees.

The tool box

is in place and over time new tools are added.

However, if

the legislator does not know what the tools can accomplish
or how to use them, then the whole tool box is a waste of
time.
Legislative oversight is nothing more than holding the
executive branch of government accountable.

In North

Dakota, the top State officials are elected by the people.
However, this does not guarantee accountability.
ability is the duty of the legislature.

Account

While time may be

the enemy of the North Dakota Legislator, it is no excuse
for ignorance of the means available to oversee the executive.
We do have legislative oversight in North Dakota.

Of

that there is no question.

There is a question as to the

quality of that oversight.

Even under a system which only

brings the legislature together once every two years, the
methods for excellent oversight are in place.

However,

the North Dakota Legislature, not unlike its counterpart in
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Washington, D.C., has not come close to achieving its
legislative oversight potential.
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